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RESUMEN
Portugal, un reino pobre y pequeño, llegó a ser un Estado Mercantil
pionero gracias a sus descubrimientos. ¿Cuándo estableció sus institu-
ciones fiscales como potencia mundial? ¿Una potencia marítima capaz
de ser punta de lanza de la conexión permanente entre Europa y la India
fue capaz de establecer unas instituciones fiscales modernas que garan-
tizaran un presupuesto Estatal estable? El objetivo de este artículo es
mostrar cómo el pasado imperial y fiscal impidió a la sociedad civil por-
tuguesa generar el consenso social necesario para incrementar la recau-
dación de impuestos y establecer instituciones fiscales eficientes.
Palabras clave: Estado Mercantil, Estado Fiscal, Historia Fiscal,
Portugal siglos XVI-XIX
ABSTRACT
Portugal, a poor and small kingdom, became a pioneering mercanti-
le state thanks to its Discoveries. When did Portugal establish its fiscal
institutions as a world power? Was such a powerful maritime nation,
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capable of spearheading a permanent link between Europe and India,
able to establish modern fiscal institutions strong enough to guarantee a
stable State budget? The objetive for this paper is to show that the
country’s fiscal and imperial past prevented Portuguese civil society
from establishing efficient fiscal institutions and generating a social
consent for increasing tax collection.
Keywords: Mercantile state, Fiscal state, Fiscal history, Portugal 16th-
19th centuries
JEL classification: N23, N24
1. INTRODUCTION
According to Schremmer (1989), each political regime designs its
own fiscal system, as fiscal revenues must meet the expenditure associa-
ted with the political programme of the regime. Sooner or later the con-
nection between the structure of public spending and the (possible)
collectable revenues must occur. The rise of fiscal states in Europe in the
modern period, has attracted ongoing attention in the last decades.
According to Schön (2005), a fiscal state is a state endorsed with the
power to bring in revenues and to service debts in order to change the
collective future as a facilitator of long run growth. The building of fis-
cal states has been the subject of extensive literature. According to
O’Brien (1999), the commitment by the central state to a standing navy
of the scope, technological efficiency and scale required to provide
safety for overseas trade was vital throughout this period. To this end,
not only did the central state create political, social and economic insti-
tutions, but it also used resources to perform political, social and eco-
nomic functions that required taxation or even public debt. According
to Daunton (2001), the British trusted Leviathan. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, for example, a powerful fiscal-military state emerged in Britain
and, after the Napoleonic wars, the notion of the state as a tax-eater
required a lot of support and trust on the part of citizens and taxpayers.
In building huge navies, the political power in pre-industrial European
countries was easing a commercial revolution and creating conditions
for inter-continental trade, maritime cities, agglomeration and networ-
king economies. Acemoglu (2005) stresses the role of efficient institu-
tions in positive long run growth, a decisive aspect for geopolitical hege-
mony and performance: «From 1500, and especially from 1600
onwards, in countries with non-absolutist initial institutions and easy
access to the Atlantic, the rise in Atlantic trade enriched and strengthe-
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ned commercial interests outside the royal circle, and enabled them to
demand and obtain the institutional changes necessary for economic
growth» 1.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the Portuguese case against
this backdrop. In a global perspective Portugal is a particular case study
because it was a pioneering mercantile state thanks to its Discoveries.
How did the small kingdom of Portugal manage to become such a
powerful maritime power that it was able to spearhead a permanent link
between Europe and India by sea and yet in the nineteenth-century the
state was bankrupt? How did the King of Portugal expect to profit from
the monopoly of this trade link? How did the exceptional position of
Portugal in the trade between Europe and India collapse and force
Portugal to become, little by little, an ordinary fiscal state, a transition
which was completed during the 19th century? The main objective of
this paper is to show how the pioneering role of Portugal in overseas
endeavors made it possible to overcome the early system of feudal reve-
nue and expenditure and move towards a mercantile profile. A second
objective is to establish that the success of these overseas endeavors
delayed the transition to an efficient fiscal state.
The revenue and expenditure structure in the early sixteenth century
was a consequence of the pioneering role of Portugal in overseas
Discoveries since the second decade of the fifteenth century. The success
of Asian expansion thanks to da Gama’s voyage and the formation of the
Portuguese State of India supported a mercantile state in Portugal, ins-
tead of a feudal state. A light fiscal burden on landed gentry and pea-
santry, the nominal freezing of internal taxes and the abundance of reve-
nue proceeding from commercial activities in which a prosperous mer-
cantile class was involved were the main consequences. The loss of
Eastern trade monopoly in the late sixteenth century seems to have led
to a drive to Brazil, where businesses ran from spice trade to sugar plan-
tations, as a response, and the replacement of trading profits by customs
as the main revenue. Monarchs and politicians adopted interventionist
trade policies to capture profits for their own countries. Irwin (1991)
describes the Dutch rivalry in the seventeenth century as «a managerial
incentive scheme (...) to achieve a Stackelberg leadership position
against the English» and uses a Cournot duopoly model for a standard
profit-maximizing objective, also using Helpman and Krugman’s theory
of strategic trade policy (1989) as an analogy of Mercantilism in this
epoch 2. In Portugal the need to create new taxes such as the wine tax
(real de água) and income tax (décima) was a first move towards the
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establishment of a fiscal state, with no class exempt from income tax,
although the clergy only paid only a mode in lieu of it. In any case, inter-
nal taxes did not exceed customs.
According to the literature, increasingly expensive wars in the seven-
teenth-century had far-reaching effects3. For the Portuguese Exchequer,
wars with European rivals concerning overseas possessions and with the
Western Hapsburg Empire for independence in the seventeenth century
were real European challenges which required adaptations. However,
Brazilian gold and Portuguese wine as sources of prosperity in the eigh-
teenth century soon meant that customs became the main source of
revenue, a situation which meant there was less pressure to modernize
the fiscal structure. Only the exhaustion of gold mining really brought
about the collapse of the mercantile state. The Portuguese delay in the
process of introducing appropriate fiscal adjustments and institutions is
a special historical experience among European nations. Not until the
nineteenth century would Portugal implement real fiscal and institutio-
nal changes. The French wars and the loss of Brazilian trade monopoly
(and later of Brazil as a colony as well) would lead to the particularly
painful creation of a fiscal state in the nineteenth century, thanks to the
pressing need to adapt the Portuguese fiscal structure. Although the
mercantile class, landowners and peasants did not enjoy the same pos-
sibilities of escape, paying taxes was an attitude that depended on social
acceptance and not only on fiscal laws.
Section 1 of this paper deals with the fiscal basis of the early Portu-
guese voyages of discovery and Section 2 focuses on a model of the ideal
mercantile state. The remaining sections deal with the Brazilian empire
and its collapse, and the difficult transition of Portugal to a typical libe-
ral fiscal state and its first false start at modern economic growth. The
consequences for Portugal were the establishment of a Constitutional
Monarchy as a response to the challenges that industrialisation and glo-
balisation were posing to the old powerful maritime Portugal. States
establish and sustain institutions and cultures which may promote or
restrain long run economic growth. In the mid nineteenth century, the
nation which had been a leader during the Discovery period of the early
sixteenth century was an underdeveloped indebted country. Although
political adjustments occurred in creating a Constitutional Monarchy in
the country, no social consent existed regarding the collection of taxes
able to support the political blueprint of the new institutional frame-
work.
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2. THE FISCAL ROOTS OF A WORLD POWER
On 6 January 1501, King Manuel I of Portugal went to the village of
Restelo in the outskirts of Lisbon, from where Vasco da Gama’s fleet had
left for its discovery of the Cape of Good Hope route almost four years
before, and laid the first stone of the Church of Saint Mary of
Bethlehem, a memorial to that historic voyage. (Several engravings and
paintings on the main altar of the church, locally known as the
Jerónimos, relate to the feast of Epiphany, evoking the day on which
construction of the church began). The king was certainly upset by the
failure of the schemes he had prepared during the previous years to
become sovereign of a united Iberia (or at least to ensure such a role for
one of his descendants), the result of several deaths in his family. The
main idea had been for him to marry Isabel, daughter of the King of
Aragon, Fernando, and the Queen of Castile, Isabel (1496). Isabel beca-
me the heir apparent to the thrones of Aragon and Castile (1497), but
died the following year (1498). The situation was repeated with Miguel,
the child she bore King Manuel in 1500. The crowns of Castile and
Aragon were to skip Juana, the king’s other daughter, and pass to her son
Charles (born in 1500), and usually known as the Fifth.
The king was certainly pleased with the success of Vasco da Gama’s
voyage of discovery, which seemed to ensure a firm basis for the future
prosperity of the kingdom to be ruled by him and his descendants. As a
sign of his confidence he had taken the title of Lord of Trade, Navigation
and Conquest of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India, on the return of
Vasco da Gama’s fleet.
In 1400 (one century before King Manuel’s inauguration of
Jerónimos), the kings of Portugal and Castile had signed a truce putting
an end to three decades of protracted, although intermittent, warfare
between the two countries (1369-1371, 1372-1373, 1381-1382, 1383-
1387, 1396-1400). Repeated and ineffectual attempts at mutual interfe-
rence in the internal affairs of the neighbouring country had convinced
both governments that the ground for political gains had to be found
elsewhere, leading to future plans for the unification of Iberia. These
wars had, however, a positive consequence from a fiscal point of view for
Portugal. In 1385, the Cortes (an assembly of representatives of the eccle-
siastical, noble and popular orders of the population) voted in favour of
the payment of a tax on transactions, the sisas. This tax was to become
the main fiscal basis of the Portuguese Crown. Curiously, the name of a
similar Castilian tax, alcavalas, became a synonym of tax hindrance to
trade in the Portuguese language. It is fair to conclude that this exten-
sion of the fiscal rights of the Crown beyond the traditional tariffs was
rather unpopular. However, as the main Portuguese chronicler of these
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4 Godinho 1963); (1971), Vol. I, pp. 65-94.
5 The feudal character of the Portuguese and Iberian medieval society has been the sub-
ject of much debate. Soares, 1979; Mattoso (1985).
wars, Fernão Lopes, wrote, referring to the increased taxation and infla-
tion (because of the loss of value of the currency) they caused, «it is bet-
ter for the Kingdom to suffer, than to be lost». The choice of the
Portuguese kings was expansion in Morocco, a decision supported by
three ideas. Firstly, the infidel status of the country sanctified the mili-
tary endeavour there as a holy war. Secondly, Moroccan towns were the
points of arrival of trans-Saharan gold caravans, which promised good
business. Thirdly, the country had been as badly hurt as the rest of the
Mediterranean world by the demographic crisis of the 14th century, so
victory might be easy. Alas, only the first proposition proved correct. The
Portuguese had a harder time than expected in Morocco. Ceuta (1415)
was a good start, but further advance had to wait until the third quarter
of the century and was mixed with some bitter defeats (such as Tangier
in 1437 and Fez in 1443). Worse still, as Portuguese possessions remai-
ned as isolated fortresses in a hostile country, their economic prosperity
dwindled as a consequence of the Christian conquest as profitable trade
looked for alternative outlets 4.
Fortunately, Portugal had other cards to play. Not only were there fis-
hermen and traders ready to try to find fresh ground for maritime ende-
avours, but also, as would be expected in a feudal society, ecclesiastical
and aristocratic lords were ready to give formal backing to such ventu-
res. They were used to providing public goods, such as justice and defen-
ce, and to collecting fiscal revenue as a compensation for them 5. The
tithe represented a general ecclesiastical tax paid by all Portuguese sub-
jects. Local taxes called foros formed the feudal tax system, which,
depending on location, benefited local ecclesiastical or aristocratic lords,
vassals to the King, or the King himself, if he happened to be the direct
local lord.
The Knights of Christ, a religious military order with roots in the
Portuguese branch of the Templars, which had been suppressed, and
were led by a member of the royal family who came to be known as
Henry the Navigator, were particularly active. Although he hardly set
foot on a ship himself, he promoted sea borne activities and was rewar-
ded with the control of Madeira (late 1410s), the Azores (1430s) and the
trade with the Western coast of Africa (1430s), which eventually provi-
ded a direct link to the Trans-Saharan gold trade, bypassing Muslim tra-
ders, as well as direct trade in ivory and slaves. Lack of space makes it
impossible to go into the very interesting technical details of the seafa-
ring improvements needed for these activities, which formed an impor-
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tant innovation cluster, including regular sea voyages, astronomic deter-
mination of latitudes, etc.
Slowly but steadily, these maritime endeavours began to bring profits
to their promoters and to provide a basis for further explorations.
Mention should be made of the economic organisation of the colonisa-
tion of Madeira and the Azores, because of their importance as early
experiments which were to become very important in the colonisation of
the New World. Madeira was the first example of a plantation economy,
as soon as the Portuguese colonists discovered its suitability for the pro-
duction of sugar. A slave workforce brought from the Canary Islands and
the West coast of Africa was the backbone of this first epoch of Madeira’s
economy, which ended during the 16th century as American plantations
developed. (The second trump card of Madeira’s economy would be the
vineyard, developed mainly during the 17th century). The Azores, where
European peasants tried to reproduce small-scale production of typical
European crops, were the first example of a settlement economy. At the
same time, the gold, ivory and the slave trade of the West coast of Africa
also prospered.
Moreover, for a while (during the 1460s) the eastward orientation of
the northern coast of the Gulf of Guinea engendered hopes of a
Southeast route to the Indian Ocean near at hand. As these hopes were
dashed by the southward turn of the African coast in the region of
Cameroon, consolidation of the first Portuguese colonial empire meant,
for the first time, concentration of the whole business in the hands of the
Crown. Credit for this concentration is usually given to King John II,
who also became the crucial figure in the Portuguese version of the pro-
cess of centralisation of royal power against the traditional prerogatives
of ecclesiastical and feudal lords typical of late medieval and early
modern Europe. (Of course, such a centralisation of royal power did not
mean suppression of the plurality of providers of public goods and fiscal
systems, which survived until the early nineteenth century). Expeditions
aimed at discovering the Southeast passage to the Indian Ocean follo-
wed, succeeding with Bartolomeu Dias’ voyage in 1488. The fact that a
further decade was needed to transform this discovery into a practical
Cape of Good Hope route by Vasco da Gama’s voyage of 1497-1499 cle-
arly illustrates the technological and financial difficulties of the project.
3. THE FIRST WORLD SYSTEM
At the beginning of the sixteenth century the Portuguese mercantile
empire comprised two elements. One was the splendid success of the
«Cape (sea) route» to India monopolised by Portugal, and within
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7 On the role of foreign trade for the central state revenues and the king’s power, see
Deyon, 1969.
8 Godinho (1978), p. 56.
9 On the Portuguese efforts to preserve monopoly conditions for navigation and trade
against piracy see Godinho, Vitorino Magalhães, «As incidências da pirataria e da conco-
rrência na economia marítima portuguesa no século XVI», Ensaios II, 1978.
Portugal by the Crown. This success was due to the possibility of brin-
ging exotic Asian goods to European markets with low transportation
costs 6. Merchants were often authorised to do private business but had
to pay lump sums and custom duties for the privilege. Core European
states were too busy building their own central states and for some time
no other European country was interested in applying economic resour-
ces to an uncertain business. The early Portuguese central state enjoyed
monopolistic conditions for as long as possible.
The other element of the Portuguese mercantile empire was the
Atlantic and Brazilian trade, under the partitioned hegemony provided
by the Tordesilhas Treaty with Castile. (The treaty was signed in 1494,
roughly mid way between the two pioneering ocean voyages that opened
the world: Colombus’ discovery in 1492 and da Gama’s voyage to India
in 1498). Foreign competitors soon appeared and private business was
the rule, although the obligation to use Portuguese ports for intermedia-
tion of colonial trade (the main rule of the Colonial Pact) was soon intro-
duced.
The Cape route was particularly relevant and successful, as high pro-
fits on the goods brought from Asia into Lisbon before they were re-
exported from there to the rest of Europe were possible. Foreign trade
became a splendid source of fiscal revenues, particularly because of the
monopolistic conditions present in this trade for a long time. The neces-
sary circulation of the money (gold and silver – scarce resources), once
inside the country, may be recalled as a symbol of the rise of a mercan-
tilist state ruled by a powerful king in the perspective that foreign trade
was a zero-sum game 7. Revenues from duties on imports and exports at
the Lisbon customs multiplied seventeen fold between 1496 and 1593 8.
This increase may be considered as a «rent» provided by the exploitation
of monopolistic conditions. While some core European countries were
involved in wars, the smallest of the Iberian countries ruled the waves of
the first world system. Charles V’s empire mainly opposed France (1521-
1556) and Turkey (1569-1580) 9.
A central question is whether it was the high central state revenues
that helped to build a large trade empire or whether the large Portuguese
trade empire of the sixteenth century helped to build the central state, as
seems to have been the case in England. Although Portugal could not
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rule and administrate vast territories in Asia, control over a network of
strategic trading centres through military fortresses and a superior naval
power over local navies were enough to rule Asian trade. This system of
ruling vast regions with minimal costs was invented by two viceroys in
India, Afonso de Albuquerque and Francisco de Almeida.
In an abstract model, the ideal mercantile state enjoys a monopoly
of the connections between two important markets. From the foreign
market (Asia) came the cargoes of an important commodity (at first
chiefly pepper, later other «drugs» such as cinnamon, cloves, nutmeg,
coffee, etc, cotton and silk textiles, sophisticated pottery, etc.). As the
poet puts it:
He carries burning Pepper, which he brought;
Nutmegs (the which their own dry´de flow´rs up trim)
From Banda; the black Clove(for which is sought
Maluco´s Isle) and Cinnamon, through which
Ceylan is noble, beautiful, and rich
(Camões, Lusíadas, IX, 14)
«Leva a pimenta ardente que comprara;
A seca flor de Banda não ficou;
A noz e o negro cravo, que faz clara
A nova ilha deMoluco, com a canela
Com que Ceilão é rica, ilustre e bela»
(Camões, Lusíadas, IX, 14)
The ideal mercantile state buys this (or these) commodity (commo-
dities) and brings it (them) to the home market (Europe) to be sold to
(hopefully) eager and wealthy consumers. The profit of the operation
(P), with perfect information as a benchmark case, is, of course, the pro-
duct of the quantity bought, transported and sold (Q), by the unit profit,
which is the difference between the selling price (S), and the sum of the
buying price (B) and the transport price (T):
P  Q (S  B  T)  0
Of course, what is called here «transport price» must include not only
the transport price in the strict sense (which corresponds to the freight
that would be paid to a provider of transportation services), but also the
losses of cargo in shipwrecks (which corresponds to the premium that
would be paid to a provider of insurance services) and the protection
costs against predators of the business (mainly pirates in North Atlantic
waters between the Azores and the Portuguese mainland from Europe
and the Maghreb). Of course, the ideal mercantile state provides the
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transportation and the protection and seldom makes insurance con-
tracts.
The short-term strategic variable to be manipulated by the ideal mer-
cantile state is, of course, the quantity of commodity to be bought, trans-
ported and sold. To maximise total profit P, the ideal mercantile state
must buy, transport and sell a quantity Q* of commodity such that
Q*   (S  B  T) / (dS/dQ  dB/dQ  dT/dQ)
Which makes dP/dQ  0.
As dS/dQ  0 (to increase the quantity sold, the price must be lowered)
and dB/dQ  0 (to increase the quantity bought, the price must be raised),
and it is possible to assume without much trouble that dT/dQ  0 (there
are no economies or diseconomies of scale in transportation), we may be
confident that Q* is positive.
If we assume that d2S/dQ2  0 and d2B/dQ2  0, we may also be con-
fident that d2P/dQ2  2 (dS/dQ  dB/dQ) is negative, which ensures that
Q* is really a maximum.
In practice, the ruler of the ideal mercantile state must find a middle
ground between the absence of connection between the two markets,
which ensures a maximum difference between the selling and buying
prices, but provides no profit because there is no trade, and the full con-
nection between the two markets, which reduces the difference between
the selling and buying prices to the level of the transportation prices,
and, therefore, also provides no profit.
According to O’Rourke and Williamson (2005) European consumers
did not appropriate all the benefits of the Cape route and Portugal could
appropriate some of these benefits, exceeding the initial Venetian profit 10.
The short-term problem is to find the best way to maximise total profit
in this model. The long-term problem is to preserve the monopoly of the
connection, a fairly familiar problem involving entrance barriers, becau-
se success depends upon mercantile elites and efficient commercial ins-
titutions. The main difficulty in the case of sixteenth century Portugal is
that the monopoly depended on the exclusivity of the technology and
geographical knowledge needed to sail the Cape of Good Hope route,
which was impossible to preserve in the long run, either because of
information leaks, or because potential competitors could imitate the
Portuguese by trial and error (and it was impossible for the Portuguese
to ensure full control of the «closed» sea they claimed in the South
Atlantic and South Indian Oceans). By the late sixteenth century
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13 Godinho, Vitorino Magalhães, «1580 e a Restauração», Ensaios II (1978).
14 Modelsky (1988). Modelsky (1988a).
Portuguese monopoly of the Cape route collapsed under the efforts of
Dutch, English and French merchants 11. Portugal tried to resist throug-
hout most of the seventeenth century but by the 1660s it already had
only a minor share of the Cape route trade.
4. THE SECOND WORLD SYSTEM
Profitable activities attracted new partners into business. Before the
1560s, the main danger was piracy. As six large ships per year were
enough to bring the annual cargoes, piracy was very attractive. From the
1560s on, European countries developed new naval systems for mana-
ging sea voyages to Asia, putting an end to the Portuguese monopoly of
Asian goods trade that had lasted for almost one hundred years. New
ships were quicker and more easily manoeuvrable 12. As European coun-
tries began trading in the Indian Ocean and conquering strategic sea-
ports from 1620 to 1660, competition became the rule in the market
under the supervision of the British and Dutch Companies for Trade. For
Portugal, Godinho (1978) refers to 1580 as a turning point 13. Gains of
trade, agglomeration and networking economies between maritime
cities were shared with other partners. A new world system, based on
European water transportation advantages and Marshallian increasing
returns, delocalised the core trading centre from Lisbon to Antwerp,
Amsterdam and London. However, the number of rival European states
engaging in geopolitical and mercantilist competition for trade coloni-
sation and colonial empires was limited. Historical global conditions
were much closer to the conditions of the oligopoly game with a succes-
sion of leading powers in the world market and followers. In this second
world system Portugal could no longer perform the leading role it had
enjoyed in the world in sixteenth century and became a follower.
Modelsky and Thompson also refer to the 1580s as the turning point
from the first to the second world system 14. The trade in tropical com-
modities from the American continent was organised as an informal car-
tel using collusive solutions resulting from tacit agreements reached for
geopolitical reasons – an oligopoly with separated production areas,
monopolised selling areas in part of Europe and competition in other
selling areas. Collusive prices were more likely to be in equilibrium
because of countries’ permanent interaction in the new trade during the
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seventeenth century and because of the growth of the business. Wars
between mercantilist states may be compared to redistribution proces-
ses within this cartel of major powers 15.
For Portugal, the most favourable production area for trade in the
new second world system was Brazil. From the 1580s on, the main ori-
gin of tropical goods traded in Lisbon became the Brazilian coasts.
Several tropical goods were appreciated in European markets and could
be produced in this Portuguese colony, still providing high revenues.
Brazilian sugar was cultivated by African slave labour and dominated
Brazilian exports. However, dye-producing wood and tobacco were also
attractive, providing large exports to Lisbon 16. Not only did European
countries manage to cultivate sugar in other South American posses-
sions from 1650 on, but also free business conditions were available for
Portuguese merchants and private businesses. The decreasing prices of
tropical goods (especially sugar) in European markets were due to com-
petition between Brazil and other producers (such as Dutch, French,
English and Spanish cultivation of sugar), as the provision of European
markets by all these producers left each of them with smaller shares in
the cargoes and lower prices 17. In fact, the worst price war to punish
deviation would have been to set price at the level of marginal cost, mea-
ning zero profit. Considering the markets in isolation, tacit agreements
were unstable, but taking them together it was easier to attain equili-
briums because the punishment for deviation and defection was to
engage in price wars and retaliation in other markets. European part-
ners supported massive and sustained investment in naval power which
allowed aggressive commercial policies and interesting discounted
payoffs.
The eventual reduction of tax revenues from Brazilian trade and
increases of expenditure because of the wars (against the United
Provinces, England and France to preserve overseas possessions, and
against the Western Hapsburg Empire to restore Portuguese autonomy)
forced the Portuguese exchequer to introduce new taxes on consumption
(Real d’água, a tax on the consumption of wine and meat, created in the
1630s) and income (royal tithe in the 1640s). Thus, the Portuguese state
began to adopt a more fiscal and less mercantile profile. National navies
were floating fortresses and war periods always made the creation of
new taxes necessary in order to support military expenditure. Defence
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was a first rank priority and severe foreign tension led to an increasing
tax burden 18.
Peaceful periods followed, but the royal tithe was never abolished
and took a permanent place alongside excises and taxes on consump-
tion. These taxes were the main basis for the future Portuguese State fis-
cal system. Even so, duties were able to provide high revenues and the
Portuguese central state was able to go on feeding its budget as coloni-
sation in Brazil continued to provide a mercantile profile to the
Portuguese exchequer. The high weight of customs in overall taxation
resulted not only from the greater volume of trade, but also from the
ease with which imports could be taxed. In Lisbon, the main Portuguese
port-city and capital of the empire, a modest number of officers sufficed
to collect huge amounts of revenue. In 1641 and 1681 Lisbon customs
represented 88 per cent and 79 per cent of total customs revenue res-
pectively 19.
In the 1680s, gold mines were discovered in Minas Gerais in Brazil. A
tax amounting to 1/5 of gold inflows from Brazil provided huge amounts
of gold for coinage and supported public expenditure in the first half of
the eighteenth century (from 1695 to about 1754). Because of the large
quantities of gold available, this situation provided a second significant
role for Portugal in the world system and glorious support for a leading
position in the world market 20. Brazilian-Portuguese gold fuelled trade
with Great Britain and the Baltic region, providing access to silver for
trade in Asia. Once again the colonial empire was the main source of
public funding. This new model was short-lived, however. Brazilian gold
was almost exhausted by the middle of the eighteenth century 21. At the
same time, due to the development of more efficient economic and
financial institutions by those countries, Portugal lagged behind 22.
The Portuguese central state needed to satisfy permanent financial
expenditure with domestic fiscal revenues, as did other European states.
The Brazilian gold boom coincided with an elevated role for domestic
taxes for two reasons. Firstly, the eighteenth century Portuguese kings
inherited fairly old domestic taxes (created in times of foreign threat, as
explained above) from their ancestors. Secondly, the Portuguese eco-
nomy saw a period of short-term prosperity (rooted mainly in wine
exports), but long-term development did not follow. The Portuguese case
does not fit neatly into the European central state profile. As the country
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was much poorer, customs and rents from monopolies still provided a
much higher support. Average data for the period 1762-1777 illustrate
this situation:
Moreover, the society of the Ancient Regime allowed great discrepan-
cies in taxation according to social status, birth condition and local tra-
dition. Only three taxes applied to everybody: two of them had been cre-
ated in the past under foreign threat; a local tax on consumption of
goods, particularly on meat and wine, was absorbed by the central state
in the seventeenth century and applied across the board to all subjects
and territories. As in other European countries, the late eighteenth cen-
tury brought political centralisation to Portugal and broader functions
to the central state. Under a pressing need to move towards safer collec-
tion systems, the government created a tax on the leading agricultural
export staple: wine. This tax was applied to support the University of
Coimbra. Because of the association of this tax with higher education, it
received the special name of «literary subsidy» (subsidio literario) 23.
In order to increase the state’s efficiency in the process of assessment
and collection of revenue, Pombal’s illuminated government also created
(in 1761) centralised accounting in the Royal Exchequer (Erario Regio).
Functions included defence, justice, administration throughout the
national territory and primary matters regarding education. In such an
illiterate country, literacy became a concern and university teaching
even demanded the creation of the subsidio literario, as explained
above 24.
TABLE 1 
THE STRUCTURE OF PORTUGUESE PUBLIC REVENUES
(AVERAGE DATA FOR THE PERIOD 1762-1777)
Customs (domestic and foreign)................................. 24.15 %
Tobacco......................................................................... 17.00 %
1/5 on Gold................................................................... 11.75 %
Diamonds ..................................................................... 4.95 %
Royal tithe .................................................................... 10.35 %
Sundry revenues .......................................................... 6.7 %
Excise............................................................................ 6.25 %
Overseas revenues........................................................ 5.35 %
Brazil wood .................................................................. 2.35 %
TOTAL ...................................................................... 100 %  (=5 253 contos)
Source: Tomaz, (1988), p. 362-363.
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This was only a first step towards a fiscal profile. The main adjus-
tments were to take place in the nineteenth century. Such a delay provi-
ded the background for new political institutions.
5. A SECOND STEP TOWARDS A FISCAL PROFILE
Wars against revolutionary and imperial France (1793-1795, 1801)
called for new taxes: a stamp tax and a consumption tax on luxury items.
Furthermore, French occupations (1807-1808, 1809, 1810-1812) forced
the royal family to take refuge in Brazil and to open its ports to direct
foreign trade. Brazilian independence soon followed (1822) and put an
end to all remnants of the old mercantile state. The superior performan-
ce of the navies of other European countries can explain the importance
of scale in trading. The British navy was outstandingly efficient but fle-
ets from other rival powers were also successful. These countries could
appropriate the gains from the maritime trade, the scale economies as
well as the agglomeration and networking economies. According to
Krugman (1995) a system of increasing returns can explain delocalisa-
tion effects for economic activities and the creation of poles and peri-
pheries. As for Portugal, the Indian and Brazilian colonial empires were
gone forever and peripherisation became unavoidable, because for other
partners the interconnections of the naval-mercantile complex with
commerce and international trade pushed their national economies to
plateaux of opportunities and capacities for precocious industrialisa-
tions. As a new (African) colonial empire would not be created until the
«scrambling for Africa» in the last decades of the nineteenth century, a
clear fiscal profile was imposed on the Portuguese state. Even this new
(African) colonial empire, created after the Berlin Conference (1885),
was too poor to allow the same mercantile success as provided by pre-
vious empires 25.
The pattern for the fiscal state had some similarities with most conti-
nental countries under the Liberal framework in Europe, but was extre-
mely difficult and painful in the Portuguese case 26. Late eighteenth cen-
tury Romantic ideas based on the liberal claim of freedom, equality and
fraternity were widespread and brought new ideals of justice and equity.
The concept of each man as a citizen aided the fiscal character of central
states. The solution to the fiscal problem, in Portugal as in other coun-
tries, was to endorse liberal ideas to frame new institutional arrange-
ments – to abolish Church and feudal fiscal systems and to increase State
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fiscal revenue to encompass the revenue of the former 27. This was a slow
and painful process in a society without «inherited Calvinist norms that
militated against extravagance». In Portugal it took a civil war to impose
a Constitutional Monarchy (1828-1834) and this was followed by further
decades of civil unrest (in the 1830s and 1840s). Military expenditure to
restore peaceful conditions was supported by foreign borrowing in a
country with low saving habits 28. This cost of the liberal victory meant a
legitimisation of the central state as the only institution to collect taxes
from citizens. Central state monopoly in taxation allowed an expansion
of state revenues all over Europe. The Dutch seventeenth century rival is
considered a case of fiscal exception, because «for nearly three centuries,
the provincial States had resisted a trend toward centralisation experien-
ced by almost every other European state», but was able to achieve the
unification of debts in 1798 as well as a unitary tax system 29: «The resul-
ting rationalisation of administration, imposition of uniform tax rates,
and shift from a reliance on indirect to direct taxation, all had the imme-
diate effect of increasing total tax revenues by nearly one third, not-
withstanding the somber economic conditions of the times» 30. In
Portugal the idea was to fill the gap left by the abolition of other fiscal
systems by expanding public tax collection, profiting from the citizen’s
ability to pay. Despite the fact that many could afford to pay, resistance
existed and, in fact, was common. In contrast with Rosenthal’s (1998)
approach to the French case, not only the elite classes refused fiscal pres-
sure in peaceful times, mob uprisings and general social unrest also
occurred. Although liberal ideologies and Parliament surveillance of
public finance were established in the Constitution of 1834 and were
commonly accepted, riots occurred during difficult economic periods.
The so-called Maria-da-Fonte popular revolt in the 1840s and the so-
called Janeirinha in Lisbon and Oporto in 1868 were the most critical
moments of resistance against two attempts to increase tax payments 31.
This social reaction may be interpreted as «a loss of consent» from tax-
payers for more universal and less regressive fiscal systems.
The question was how to expand fiscal exaction. The solution was to
divide the traditional royal tithe into different taxes according to the
revenues to be taxed (land revenues, industrial revenues, or interests) in
order to increase collection throughout the 1850s and ‘60s using an effec-
tive bureaucracy for this purpose. However, customs continued to provi-
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de the lion’s share to the Exchequer. Table 2 shows comparative data for
Mediterranean countries and the UK, the strongest colonial power.
No other country matched the role of customs duties in fiscal revenues
in the selected sample. The weight of customs in Portugal was greater than
in the UK throughout the nineteenth century. This fact may be the result of
the small size and openness of the Portuguese economy, but it is certainly
linked to the difficulties of implementing a coercive power after three cen-
turies of imperial customs tradition. Other explanations may reside in the
lower exaction cost of customs revenue and the lower political cost com-
pared with internal indirect and (especially) direct taxes. British values are
close to the Portuguese levels only in the early twentieth century, but the
degree of openness and the tax rate on the traded goods sector differed con-
siderably in the two countries. According to Comín 1996), tax evasion is a
common attitude in Latin countries, particularly in Spain, a country with
a large colonial empire. However, Table 2 shows a much smaller ratio of
customs revenues on total fiscal collection in Spain, because of the larger
dimension of the Iberian neighbour and the lower degree of openness of
the Spanish economy 32. The difficulties of implementing a coercive power
for a universal fiscal system in Portugal were even recognised in the natio-
nal Parliament. On 14 May 1880 the Deputy José Rodrigues de Freitas
honestly said: «In Portugal, taxes are not paid according to the direct propor-
tion of the wealth of each person, but according to the inverse proportion of
his political influence» 33. Evading the payment of one’s taxes did not affect
reputation or bring social disapproval and such a generalised attitude cre-
ated a national cultural context prone to fiscal evasion 34.
TABLE 2 
RATIO OF CUSTOMS REVENUES ON TOTAL FISCAL REVENUE (%)
Year UK Italy France Spain Portugal
1850  23 — 9 13 41 (1852)
1860 37 16 7 11 44
1870 35 10 6 11 33
1880 29 12 9 15 39
1890 28 19 14 17 43
1900 23 19 12 18 33
1910 28 21 15 15 31
Sources: Comín, (1996), p. 219; Mata, (1993b), pp. 129, 136.
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The revenues funding public expenditure constrain the political
action of government, as «It seems to be an historical law that govern-
ments always wanted to spend more; a different aspect is to consider if
they could» 35. In the Portuguese Parliament, discussions took place to
attempt to define the objectives of the fiscal system 36. To collect as much
money as possible? To collect enough money to cover the amount of
selected expenditures? To collect the amount required to assure long run
economic growth? To collect the amount required to promote national
strategic aims related with national geopolitical performance?
Curiously, collection in terms of the exact amount that would provide
Pareto’s optimum for collective welfare was never discussed and the
need to collect as much as was considered necessary to maximise the
longevity of the government was never confessed to. However, reading
the available contemporary Parliamentary political speeches, it is also
clear that there was an explicit consciousness of the relationships bet-
ween the fiscal system and growth.
Improving the efficiency of tax collection meant improving public
administration and extending the network of civil servants throughout
the country in order to develop a true fiscal network over the entire
nation for assessment and collection. This became a priority for the cen-
tral state from the 1840s on, in order to administrate and control the
whole territory and lasted until the First World War. The high transpor-
tation and information costs of putting Lisbon (the central state capital)
in contact with every part of the country were real problems to be over-
come. This was true for the European territory of the kingdom, because
private initiatives to build transportation facilities were common throug-
hout Europe but weak in Portugal. This was particularly true for the
administration and taxation situation in the Atlantic islands of Azores
and Madeira. Worries about transportation and communication facilities
such as roads, railways and telegraph and, later, telephones were pre-
sented in Portugal as the main issues for promoting economic growth
and modernisation, but this happened very late in comparison with
other European partners. In Portugal the ideal of state efficiency inclu-
ded the provision of these public goods by the central state, because of
market mechanism failure.
In this way, nineteenth century Portuguese politicians equated pro-
gress with material infrastructures and their provision as public goods 37.
Such a framework for social welfare meant subsidising private compa-
nies or public provision in the case of a failure through private supply.
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These new social functions of the central state required more revenue 38.
New functions included support for transportation and communications
facilities, as well as health and more education. The project consisted of
a sustained compliance with a massive upswing in taxation and loans
being allocated overwhelmingly to the funding of a successful strategy
for domestic order, stability and long run economic growth to overcome
underdevelopment. The escape was protection as high tariffs could com-
pensate for the difficulties in fiscal collection and provide revenues for
the budget 39. Figure 1 shows the average tariff rate for Portugal and the
core countries 40. It is measured as import duties as a share of total
import values and was extremely high in Portugal throughout the second
half of the nineteenth century.
The fiscal roots of the Portuguese central state were not strong
enough in its mainland territory to support the government’s financial
schemes of indebtedness to perform those policies. In a global perspec-
tive, only Latin American countries experienced such high average tariff
rates 41. It is time to conclude that, in a long run perspective the transi-
tion to an ordinary fiscal state was quite inefficient in Portugal and ran
FIGURE 1
AVERAGE TARIFF RATES 
Sources: Mata (1993b) for Portugal; Clemens; Williamson (2002) for the core 
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the country into a financial debacle at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury42. According to Foreman-Peck (1994) and Rodrick (1997), globali-
sation brought an increased need for a stronger central state role in pro-
viding public goods that might act as compensations for the increased
mutability and vicissitudes of global markets.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper argues that Portugal adapted poorly to the change from
mercantile to fiscal state. The country’s fiscal and imperial past can help
to understand the financial and the institutional adjustments of the nine-
teenth century. They led to a Constitutional framework for the
Portuguese monarchy that was hard to establish and implement in
Portugal. Moreover, from a geopolitical perspective, the early sixteenth
century leader of Discoveries had become an underdeveloped and indeb-
ted country in the nineteenth century.
Fiscal collection is constrained by the Constitutional framework and
social wealth, but consented fiscal collection may not coincide with
these constraints. It was possible to design a beautiful and profitable fis-
cal system in the context of the institutional adjustments under the cons-
titutional regime but social turmoil and fiscal evasion cancelled out
those effects. In Portugal it is quite clear that the Constitutional
Monarchy always faced practical difficulties convincing its citizens to
support its political blueprint on the provision of collective public goods
in order to foster economic growth and development.
The mercantile empire models have been evoked to explain how dif-
ficult it was to implement a domestic fiscal system that would suffice for
a country with a strong central state supported by direct taxation of
domestic activities. Tariffs and fiscal evasion were permanent features of
Portuguese social history and reactions against taxes even translated
into social turmoil in some periods, an inefficiency that was an imperial
heritage.
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